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‘Palaephatus’, Strabo and the boundaries of myth* 
 
Richard Hunter 
 
One of the principal problems confronting anyone concerned with the ancient critical 
reception of Homer and/or the broader question of how the Greeks began to construct 
distinctions in what they heard and read between history, fiction and myth, or indeed 
between science and non-science, is that it is very difficult to get back to a ‘state of 
grace’:  most of our ancient texts in these areas seem already contaminated by 
sophistications of one kind or another. That, however, may well be the point: there may 
never have been such a pure state, at least in the historical period covered by our extant 
texts? Rather, therefore, than trying, to distinguish between archaic texts, which come 
from a world which still understood, indeed functioned through, poetry and myth, and 
post-classical texts which had lost their intellectual virginity and for whom all this was 
play, I want to begin in mediis rebus with a text which is relatively early (late fourth 
century BC), but also – whenviewed from another perspective – seems very late indeed. 
This is the extant Preface to the collection of mythical rationalisations that goes under the 
name of ‘Palaephatus’:1 
 
τάδε περὶ τῶν ἀπίστων συγγέγραφα. ἀνθρώπων γὰρ οἱ μὲν εὐπειθέστεροι 
πείθονται πᾶσι τοῖς λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀνομίλητοι σοφίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης, οἱ δὲ 
πυκνότεροι τὴν φύσιν καὶ πολυπράγματοι ἀπιστοῦσι τὸ παράπαν μηδὲ γενέσθαι τι 
τούτων. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ γενέσθαι πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα. οὐ γὰρ ὀνόματα μόνον 
ἐγένοντο, λόγος δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς ὑπῆρξεν· ἀλλὰ πρότερον ἐγένετο τὸ ἔργον, 
εἶθ’ οὕτως ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ αὐτῶν. ὅσα δὲ εἴδη καὶ μορφαί εἰσι λεγόμεναι καὶ 
γενόμεναι τότε, αἳ νῦν οὐκ εἰσί, τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἐγένοντο. εἰ γάρ <τί> ποτε καὶ 
ἄλλοτε ἐγένετο, καὶ νῦν τε γίνεται καὶ αὖθις ἔσται. ἀεὶ δὲ ἔγωγε ἐπαινῶ τοὺς 
συγγραφέας Μέλισσον καὶ Λαμίσκον τὸν Σάμιον ἐν ἀρχῇ λέγοντας ‘ἔστιν ἃ 
ἐγένετο, καὶ νῦν ἔσται’. γενομένων δέ τινα οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογογράφοι 
παρέτρεψαν εἰς τὸ ἀπιστότερον καὶ θαυμασιώτερον, τοῦ θαυμάζειν ἕνεκα τοὺς 
ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ δὲ γινώσκω ὅτι οὐ δύναται τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷα καὶ λέγεται· 
τοῦτο δὲ καὶ διείληφα, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἐλέγετο. ἐπελθὼν δὲ καὶ 
πλείστας χώρας ἐπυνθανόμην τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ὡς ἀκούοιεν περὶ ἑκάστου 
αὐτῶν, συγγράφω δὲ ἃ ἐπυθόμην παρ’ αὐτῶν. καὶ τὰ χωρία αὐτὸς εἶδον ὡς ἔστιν 
                                                 
*
 A version of this essay was delivered as the Walsh Memorial Lecture at the University 
of Chicago in March 2015; I have not sought to remove every vestige of oral 
presentation. I would like to express my very warm thanks to the Department of Classics 
at Chicago for the invitation and to the audience there for much stimulating discussion 
and criticism. This paper has also benefitted from the reactions of audiences at Princeton 
University and the University of Texas at Austin. 
1
 For the sake of simplicity I will henceforth omit the inverted commas around the name. 
For Palaephatus and the relevant bibliography see esp. Hawes 2014a and 2014b; I have 
not thought it necessary to record every place where I agree with or differ from Hawes’ 
helpful accounts. The translation of the Preface offered here is awkwardly literal, but that 
seems necessary in the circumstances. 
 2 
ἕκαστον ἔχον, καὶ γέγραφα ταῦτα οὐχ οἷα ἦν λεγόμενα, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν καὶ 
ἱστορήσας. 
 
I have recorded these things concerning unbelievable matters. Some men are 
gullible and believe everything which is reported, as they have no familiarity with 
wisdom and knowledge, whereas others who are more subtle by nature and 
questioning completely disbelieve that any of these things ever happened. My 
view is that everything which is reported happened [in some form], for they were 
not merely names without any stories about them;
2
 first came the fact and then the 
story about the facts. As for the shapes and forms which are reported and 
[allegedly] occurred then, and which do not exist now, these did not exist; for if 
<anything> ever existed in another time, it both exists now and will do so in the 
future. I have always approved the prose-writers Melissos and Lamiskos the 
Samian
3
 who say, at the beginning of their work,
4
 ‘there are things which were 
and which will be again’.  Poets and chroniclers have turned some of the things 
which have happened in the direction of the unbelievable and wonderful in order 
to amaze men. But I know that things are not possible such as they are reported, 
but I have also understood that, if they had not happened [in some form], there 
would not have been reports. I travelled to very many countries and made 
enquiries of the older people as to what they had heard about each of these things, 
and I record what I learned from them. I myself saw the condition of each place, 
and I have written these things not as they have been reported, but after myself 
going and making investigations. 
‘Palaephatus’, On incredible things Preface5 
 
Uncertainties of text and interpretation do not dampen the interest of the Preface, which 
has indeed often been regarded of course as much more interesting than the 
rationalisations which follow in the Palaephatan collection. The possibility, some would 
say very strong likelihood, that this text dates from peripatetic circles in the late fourth 
century, i.e. at a crucial time for the development of collecting and thinking about the 
nature of myths and myth, merely adds to its interest.
6
 For all that Palaephatus’ denial of 
                                                 
2
 The text here is almost certainly corrupt; the translation and supplement are not 
intended to offer a solution to the textual problem.  
3τὸν Σάμιον is often regarded as an intrusive marginal gloss, originally referring to 
Melissus, who was from Samos. This is no doubt possible, but hardly certain, given the 
games with authority that Palaephatus is playing here; the only relevant Lamiskos of 
whom we know is a character from the circle of Archytas who was known to Plato (cf. 
Epist. 7.305b, Diog. Laert. 3.22). For the use Palaephatus makes of Eleatic ‘Being’ cf. 
Hawes 2014a, 44. 
4
 It is not certain that this is what the transmitted text means; corruption can (again) not 
be ruled out. 
5
 Except for punctuation, this is the text given by Festa 1902 and Santoni 2000. 
6
 Cf. Hawes 2014a, 227-38 (a full collection of the evidence), Trachsel 2005, 551-4. 
Theon, Progymn. 96 Sp. refers to ‘Palaephatus the Peripatetic’, and the Suda π70 makes 
Palaephatus a contemporary of Artaxerxes; the date of Athenion fr. 1 K-A, where a cook 
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the possibility of weird and hybrid forms seems to look forward to Lucretius’ very similar 
and certainly serious denial (5.855-924, cf. 4.722-48), the most obvious thing about this 
text, one might think, is that it is a knowing bluff or rather po-faced joke, although this is 
not how it is normally regarded. Although some modern scholars have recognised that 
Palaephatus probably did not go on extensive research trips, the Preface is almost 
universally taken as a serious justification for the practice of myth rationalisation, even 
by those who recognise that Palaephatus is adopting a pose.
7
 The reasons for this attitude 
probably lie deep within the nature of Classics and classicists, but for the moment let us 
stay with the nature of this text itself.  
 Palaephatus’ Preface is in places reminiscent of the tone, if not the arguments, of 
Lucian’s True Histories, and the historiographical pose is in fact the single most 
prominent thread which runs through the rhetoric of this ntroduction.
8
 The opening τάδε 
περὶ τῶν ἀπίστων συγγέγραφα, with its witty tension between the historiographical verb 
and the subject-matter (‘things you can’t believe’), uses a version of the same kind of 
paradoxical clash between style and subject which we find at the head of Seneca’s 
Apocolocyntosis, quid actum sit in caelo … uolo memoriae tradere, another preface 
which plays with issues of belief in the unbelievable, the authority of sources and a 
historiographical voice. If, however, the style, rather than the paradoxical subject, 
reminds us of Hecataeus’ famous opening,9 it is in fact Herodotus whose presence, 
flagged by the closing ἱστορήσας, by the whole language of belief and the recording of 
reports, and by the self-representation of the writer as a travelling inquirer after truth, 
hangs over this whole passage.
10
 This is, however, a Herodotus mediated to us through 
the famous passage with which Thucydides concludes his account of how ignorant people 
can be of even relatively recent history: 
 
οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα 
                                                                                                                                                 
who explains how his art has been responsible for human progress is called ‘a new 
Palaephatus’, is unfortunately uncertain.  
7
 Whitmarsh 2013, 17-18 considers to what extent Palaephatus’ rationalisations are 
laughable or ludic, but does not discuss the Preface; so too, Hawes 2014b, 126 observes 
that ‘we might indeed wonder about how seriously we should actually take this text’, but 
she too is there discussing the ‘irredeemably banal’ and repetitive mythic explanations, 
not the Preface. 
8
 On ‘Palaephatus’ and myth rationalisation in the historians cf., e.g., Nestle 1942, 131-
52,  Stern 1996, 10-16, id. 1999, 219-20, Santoni 2000, 19-21 (a good discussion of the 
Introduction), 30-2. Hawes 2014a, 13 rightly notes that ‘rationalistic interpretation has a 
natural affinity with historia’. 
9
 Cf. Santoni 2000, 19. Santoni also rightly cites Antiochus of Syracuse fr. 2 Jacoby, 
Ἀντίοχος Ξενοφάνεος τάδε συνέγραψε περὶ Ἰταλίας, ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων λόγων τὰ πιστότατα 
καὶ σαφέστατα; this is the kind of historiographical rhetoric which Palaephatus turns on 
its head. 
10
 Lucian offers a related parody of such enquiry when he notes that he made serious 
enquiries (ἀναζητοῦντος ... ἐμοῦ καὶ διαπυνθανομένου) of the locals who lived by the 
Eridanos about the myth of Phaethon and his sisters, though he happened to be in the 
vicinity by chance on another errand (Elec. 2).  
 4 
μᾶλλον τρέπονται. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τεκμηρίων ὅμως τοιαῦτα ἄν τις νομίζων 
μάλιστα ἃ διῆλθον οὐχ ἁμαρτάνοι, καὶ οὔτε ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ 
τὸ μεῖζον κοσμοῦντες μᾶλλον πιστεύων, οὔτε ὡς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ 
προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον, ὄντα ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ 
ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνενικηκότα, ηὑρῆσθαι δὲ 
ἡγησάμενος ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων σημείων ὡς παλαιὰ εἶναι ἀποχρώντως. 
 
So little trouble do people take to search out the truth, and so readily do they 
accept what first comes to hand. From the evidence I have presented, however, 
one would not go wrong in supposing that events were very much as I have set 
them out; and no one should prefer rather to believe the songs of the poets, who 
exaggerate things for artistic purposes, or the writings of the chroniclers, which 
are composed more to make good listening than to represent the truth, being 
impossible to check and having most of them won a place over time in the 
imaginary realm of fable. My findings, however, you can regard as derived from 
the clearest evidence available for material of this antiquity. 
Thucydides 1.20.3-21.1 (trans. J. Mynott) 
 
Palaephatus repeats Thucydides’ charge against the unreliability of ‘poets and 
chroniclers’ and the reasons for it (to make what is told more impressive, more effective 
as ἔκπληξις, to use the language of later criticism), but he does not accept that such things 
are ἀνεξέλεγκτα ‘beyond investigation’. What matters, in fact, is what you are seeking to 
investigate, i.e. what questions one might reasonably ask of mythic material. Much of the 
rich tradition of mythographical writing in the post-classical period may indeed be seen 
as a series of attempts to meet Thucydides’ pessimistic claim, and this applies not just to 
texts which are normally thought of as ‘mythographic’. In a famous passage which opens 
his Life of Theseus, Plutarch compares himself to ‘researchers in geography’ (ἐν ταῖς 
γεωγραφίαις … οἱ ἱστορικοί) and historical time to a map where ‘the parts which escape 
their [i.e. geographers’] knowledge’ are put around the edge with labels which amount 
(as would say) to ‘here be dragons’. The equivalent distinction for the historian is 
between periods of time ‘which may be reached by probable reasoning and offer territory 
for history which stays close to real events’ (τὸν ἐφικτὸν εἰκότι λόγῳ καὶ βάσιμον ἱστορίᾳ 
πραγμάτων ἐχομένῃ χρόνον) and those which are ‘the stuff of marvel and tragedy, 
inhabited by poets and mythographers, where there can be no confidence or certainty’ (τὰ 
... τερατώδη καὶ τραγικὰ ποιηταὶ καὶ μυθογράφοι νέμονται, καὶ οὐκέτ᾽ ἔχει πίστιν οὐδὲ 
σαφήνειαν). The Thucydidean heritage which gives primacy to the process of 
investigation, to the drawing of inference from evidence, the how rather than the what, if 
you will, is very clearly on show here.
11
 Plutarch will not give up on the remote edges of 
time, but rather will do what he can to bring them under a familiar umbrella: 
 
εἴη μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν ἐκκαθαιρόμενον λόγῳ τὸ μυθῶδες ὑπακοῦσαι καὶ λαβεῖν 
ἱστορίας ὄψιν· ὅπου δ’ ἂν αὐθαδῶς τοῦ πιθανοῦ περιφρονῇ καὶ μὴ δέχηται τὴν 
πρὸς τὸ εἰκὸς μεῖξιν, εὐγνωμόνων ἀκροατῶν δεησόμεθα καὶ πρᾴως τὴν 
ἀρχαιολογίαν προσδεχομένων. 
                                                 
11
 Cf., e.g., Hawes 2014a: 150-1. 
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May I succeed in cleaning out
12
 the mythical element and making it obedient to 
reason and giving it the appearance of history. Where, however, it wantonly 
scorns credibility and will not accept an admixture of the probable, I ask for an 
audience which is well-disposed and which receives this account of the distant 
past with indulgence. 
Plutarch, Theseus 1.3 
 
Plutarch accepts that there are some mythika which are beyond the exercise of logos. 
Palaephatus was not so faint-hearted. 
With a nod and a wink, Palaephatus sets out to show that even ‘those things which 
have won their way to mythic status contrary to believability (ἀπίστως)’ will yield before 
the march of σοφία and ἐπιστήμη. The mixed signals which Palaephatus gives out are 
perhaps part of the point. Thucydides had claimed that men uncritically (ἀβασανίστως) 
receive reports (ἀκοαί) about events in the past, ‘even if they occurred in their own 
country’ (1.20.1);13 Palaephatus, having distanced himself from the tall tales of the ‘poets 
and chroniclers’, now tells us that what he is writing is what, in response to his enquiries 
(πυνθάνεσθαι), the older people in any locality ‘had heard’ about their past. There is, 
admittedly, some unclarity here. The final sentence might be taken to be relevant merely 
to its immediate context, so that Palaephatus is simply here denying that he has 
‘uncritically’ written down what he has been told in each place he visited, but it seems 
more natural to understand it as picking up the opening of the Preface in a kind of ring 
composition. Some people, thus, simply believe τὰ λεγόμενα and some deny their truth 
entirely, but Palaephatus positions himself between these two extremes, by stressing both 
the fact that the legomena preserve significant traces, an idea which is in fact crucial for 
Palaephatus’ own logos,14 and also the ‘on the spot’ research he has actually done; he has 
                                                 
12
 The image is perhaps that of a land cleared of beasts (by a Heracles, for example), i.e. a 
continuation of the ‘map’ image with which the work opens, rather than of the pruning of 
luxuriant vegetation, as Hawes 2014a: 151 translates, despite the interesting parallel at 
How to study poetry 15e-f. 
13
 Thucydides’ rhetoric may find another echo in a similar context at ‘Heraclitus’, Hom. 
Probl. 3.2 where the author is dismissing those who take Homer’s poetry at face value 
and therefore regard him as impious: ἀβασάνιστος αὐτοῖς ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας κρίσις ἔρριπται, 
cf. esp. Thucyd. 1.20.3 (cited above), οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς 
ἀληθείας. Thucydides would perhaps not have been amused to learn that his defence of 
the painstaking pursuit of ‘historical truth’ was repeatedly echoed in support of the proper 
understanding of, and hence the usefulness of, the mythical. More in the Thucydidean 
tradition is Philostratus, Heroicus 7.10 where the Phoenician notes that when he was a 
child he believed the μῦθοι which his nurse told him, but when he became a young man 
(μειράκιον) ‘I thought that these things should not be accepted ἀβασανίστως’, cf. Kim 
2010, 184. 
14
 For a related, but very different, privileging of logos in a similar context of rhetorical 
self-advertisement we may compare Libanius’ introduction to his ekphrasis of the 
Chimaera (VIII 518 Foerster): ‘Unexpected/irrational (παράλογοι) forms emerged 
randomly (ἐκ τύχης) in the beginning, but having come into existence did not succeed in 
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gone to do his own investigations, which consist in part of listening to the stories of old 
men, a practice familiar from such serious later researchers as Pausanias (cf. 6.24.9). It 
has been argued that such an appeal to oral sources for myth lends ‘credibility’ to the 
mythic analyses which follow,
15
 but it seems more likely that the effect of Palaephatus’ 
claim is just the opposite: Palaephatus knows that this claim will undermine any residual 
faith in his earnestness to which we may still be clinging. Commentators solemnly point 
out that asking even a very old man you might meet on a Colchian street about, for 
example, the Golden Fleece is unlikely (to say no more) to take you as far back as 
Palaephatus’ rationalisations apparently go, but it should by now be clear that solemnity 
is perhaps not the right mood in which to approach this text. 
Blanket scepticism, then, is in fact anti-intellectual (it resists the impulse to 
investigate and ask questions) and self-defeating. It would be easy to respond that this 
claim too is at best a ludic trope: we are all now (this probably being the late fourth 
century BC) πεπαιδευμένοι avant la lettre, we know that myths as simple narrative 
material are being systematically collected and collated, the very idea of ‘myth’ is being 
interrogated, and Callimachus’ Aitia is not so many years away. This is, it must be noted, 
no longer the ‘there was once a time’ world of the early poets; ‘mythography’, which has 
clear fifth-century roots but of which from some perspectives Palaephatus may be 
considered the first extant example,
16
 changes everything. There is clearly truth in these 
objections, but Palaephatus’ claimed approach to story-telling is in fact not all that 
different from that of a Hecataeus or even a Herodotus. From one perspective, 
Thucydidean strictures allowed the explicit written formulation of what was, and 
continued to be, inherent in Greek mythic narrative: Hesiod, and it may be argued Homer 
also, knew that ‘mythic’ discourse was different from other modes, not worse or better, 
but certainly different; we exaggerate that difference, or rather exaggerate its importance, 
because so much of our evidence comes from those who were precisely interested in 
collecting this particular mode of discourse (an Apollodorus, for example), but 
Thucydides’ formulation in fact merely allowed people to say more clearly what they had 
always wanted to say.
17
 
One of the most enduring features of the literary recording and elaboration 
(διασκευή) of myth (broadly conceived) in antiquity was its capacity for embracing, 
                                                                                                                                                 
remaining; logos however preserved the forms which time concealed’. Here we should 
sense the distant echo of Empedoclean cosmogony. 
15
 Cf. Hawes 2014a, 45-7, 2014b, 137-8. 
16
 Cf., e.g., Trzaskoma 2013, xvii-xviii. The earliest occurrence of 
μυθογράφος/μυθογραφία seems to be in a pseudo-Aristotelian text of (probably) the late 
fourth century, cf. Fowler 2000a, 2000b, xxvii-xxviii, 2013b, xiv, unless the concluding 
tag of Palaephatus 26, ἀφ᾽ οὗ οἱ μυθογράφοι τὸν μῦθον ἔπλασαν, is in fact earlier than 
that text. On the rise of a genre of mythography cf. Fowler 2000b, xxvii-xxxvi, 2006, 
2013a, 2013b, xiv-xv. 
17
 This is clearly not the place to revisit the whole mythos – logos debate, or even the 
emergence of mythography (see previous note) as something distinct from 
historiography, though of course these form crucial parts of the background to any 
consideration of Palaephatus; Fowler 2011 offers important guidance and a rich 
bibliography. 
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indeed appearing to invite, the ludic. Comic poets, for example, found little difficulty in 
writing plays on the ‘Oedipus’ theme, and the most significant mythological poems of 
antiquity, Callimachus’ Aitia and Ovid’s Metamorphoses, give a very prominent place to 
humour and irony of all kinds. Palaephatus has usually just been a footnote in this 
history, and yet he has more than a few notions in common with some of the most 
splendid examples of such literary elaboration. Consider, for example, the famous 
opening (rather than the Preface) of Apuleius’ Metamorphoses. Lucius joins two other 
travellers on the road to Thessaly (land of wonders, a place where ‘traces’ of another 
order, buried elsewhere by change and progress, might well (be believed to) survive) and 
the first thing he hears is an imprecation against ‘absurd and monstrous lies’ (1.2); he 
asks to be allowed to listen in, ‘as someone who, though not curiosus [we think perhaps 
of Palaephatus’ πολυπράγματοι], wishes to know everything, or at least nearly 
everything’ (1.2). To the complete scepticism of one of his fellow-travellers he feels 
compelled to oppose the fact that things which seem novel or difficult often prove not to 
be so, si paulo accuratius exploraris (1.3); here the Thucydidean (and then Palaephatan) 
tradition of ‘investigation’ is to be put (paradoxically) to the defence of the marvellous. 
After Aristomenes has told his story of the death of Socrates, Lucius again defends what 
we might call ‘an open mind’ – nihil impossibile arbitror; there are many mira et paene 
infecta which happen, but which people simply do not believe when they are related 
(1.20). It is not just that Palaephatus shares with Apuleius’ narrator an interest in εἴδη καὶ 
μορφαί, but that both sketch out the territory of response to myth in a shared language, 
even though one put to utterly different uses. What we might think of as Lucius’ plea on 
behalf of gullibility is in fact a pointed reminder that the Thucydidean tradition can go 
too far; for his part, Palaephatus pleads for a middle way which seeks to go beyond 
simple scepticism in explaining how myth arises. The origin of the legomena has itself 
now become an appropriate object of research. 
Apuleius’ opening consideration of the credible and the impossible finds a close 
parallel in the (roughly contemporary?) Φιλοψευδεῖς ἢ ἀπιστῶν of Lucian, in which 
‘Tychiades’ plays the role of the cynical sceptic confronted, as was Apuleius’ sceptic, 
with πολλὰ τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ μυθώδη (5);18 to the more credulous, however, his blanket 
scepticism is laughable (16). Tychiades knows, moreover, that he is in the minority: 
 
καίτοι τὰ μὲν τῶν ποιητῶν ἴσως μέτρια, τὸ δὲ καὶ πόλεις ἤδη καὶ ἔθνη ὅλα κοινῇ 
καὶ δημοσίᾳ ψεύδεσθαι πῶς οὐ γελοῖον; εἰ Κρῆτες μὲν τὸν Διὸς τάφον δεικνύντες 
οὐκ αἰσχύνονται, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τὸν Ἐριχθόνιον ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναδοθῆναί φασιν καὶ 
τοὺς πρώτους ἀνθρώπους ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀναφῦναι καθάπερ τὰ λάχανα, πολὺ 
σεμνότερον οὗτοί γε τῶν Θηβαίων, οἳ ἐξ ὄφεως ὀδόντων Σπαρτούς τινας 
ἀναβεβλαστηκέναι διηγοῦνται. ὃς δ’ ἂν οὖν ταῦτα καταγέλαστα ὄντα μὴ οἴηται 
ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐμφρόνως ἐξετάζων αὐτὰ Κοροίβου τινὸς ἢ Μαργίτου νομίζῃ 
τὸ πείθεσθαι ἢ Τριπτόλεμον ἐλάσαι διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐπὶ δρακόντων ὑποπτέρων ἢ 
                                                 
18
 Cf., e.g., Kim 2010, 200-1. It is perhaps noteworthy that Lucian’s essay includes a 
narrative of ‘magic gone wrong’ (35-7), just as Lucius’ failure to reverse his 
transformation is what sets the narrative of the Metamorphoses going. On the question of 
whether the title should be Φιλοψευδής or the now conventional Φιλοψευδεῖς cf. Ogden 
2007, 3. 
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Πᾶνα ἥκειν ἐξ Ἀρκαδίας σύμμαχον εἰς Μαραθῶνα ἢ Ὠρείθυιαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου 
ἁρπασθῆναι, ἀσεβὴς οὗτός γε καὶ ἀνόητος αὐτοῖς ἔδοξεν οὕτω προδήλοις καὶ 
ἀληθέσι πράγμασιν ἀπιστῶν· εἰς τοσοῦτον ἐπικρατεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος. 
 
The stories of the poets are perhaps not so bad, but how can it not be laughable 
that cities and whole peoples tell lies in unison and in public? The Cretans feel no 
shame in exhibiting Zeus’s tomb, the Athenians claim that Erichthonius rose up 
from the earth and that the first men sprang up from Attic soil like vegetables. 
Their story, however, is much more serious than that of the Thebans who relate 
that Sown Men sprouted from a snake’s teeth. If anyone considers that these 
absurd stories are untrue, and through rational examination thinks that only a 
Koroibos or a Margites would believe that Triptolemus drove through the air with 
winged serpents or that Pan came from Arcadia to help at the battle of Marathon 
or that Oreithyia was snatched away by Boreas, they think that this man is an 
impious fool for refusing to believe such obviously true facts. So great is the sway 
of falsehood. 
Lucian, Philopseudeis 3 
 
The final myth which Tychiades cites is also a source reference. Lucian is here reworking 
the famous passage of Plato’s Phaedrus in which Plato seems to make Socrates reject 
myth rationalisation (and perhaps Palaephatus’ forerunners also): 
 
ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ 
ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός, κατ’ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ’ αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη 
μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν Ἱπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ αὖθις τὸ τῆς 
Χιμαίρας, καὶ ἐπιρρεῖ δὲ ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων καὶ ἄλλων 
ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων· αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν 
προσβιβᾶι κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἅτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, πολλῆς 
αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει. ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή· τὸ δὲ  αἴτιον, ὦ 
φίλε, τούτου τόδε. οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν· 
γελοῖον δή μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. ὅθεν δὴ 
χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, 
σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ’ ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θηρίον ὂν τυγχάνω Τυφῶνος 
πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ 
ἁπλούστερον ζῷον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον. 
 
But I, Phaedrus, think such [rationalizing] explanations are very pretty in general, 
but are the inventions of a very clever and laborious and not altogether enviable 
man, for no other reason than because after this he must explain the forms of the 
Centaurs, and then that of the Chimaera, and there presses in upon him a whole 
crowd of such creatures, Gorgons and Pegasuses, and multitudes of strange, 
inconceivable, portentous natures. If anyone disbelieves in these, and with a rustic 
sort of wisdom, undertakes to explain each in accordance with probability, he will 
need a great deal of leisure. But I have no leisure for them at all; and the reason, 
my friend, is this: I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to know 
myself; so it seems to me ridiculous, when I do not yet know that, to investigate 
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irrelevant things. And so I dismiss these matters and accepting the customary 
belief about them, as I was saying just now, I investigate not these things, but 
myself, to know whether I am a monster more complicated and more furious than 
Typhon or a gentler and simpler creature, to whom a divine and quiet lot is given 
by nature. 
Plato, Phaedrus 229d2-30a6 
Whereas Socrates, for his own reasons, rejects simple ἀπιστία and notes that anyone who 
wished seriously to apply σοφία to some myths and outlandish mythic hybrids would be 
an unhappy and very busy man, Lucian’s Tychiades presents such an exercise of 
rationality as ἐμφρόνως ἐξετάζων, but one which incurs a reputation for being ‘impious 
and foolish’. For Tychiades the matter is one of ‘truth’ or ‘falsehood’, which also stand, 
for example, at the centre of the discussion on fabulous myths in Philostratus’ Heroicus; 
for the Platonic Socrates, however, there is another way forward, one that deals with 
more interesting monsters such as Typhon and which does not seek to reduce stories to 
the banally ‘probable’, one whose aim, moreover, is not the explanation of myth, but 
rather the employment of myth in the investigation of human psychology, rationality and 
passion. We might as well call that way forward ‘allegory’,19 and it is worth reminding 
ourselves that when perhaps some five centuries later ‘Heraclitus’, who also appeals to 
ἐπιστήμη (Hom. Probl. 6.2), notes that ‘the ignorant’ take as ‘mythical 
inventions/fictions’ what Homer spoke ‘philosophically’ (Hom. Probl. 3.2), he too in fact 
stands within the Platonic path, for all that he then vents his spite against the philosopher 
in the following chapter. ‘Rationalisation’, particularly in its simpler forms, is itself a 
form of allegorisation;
20
 one thinks of the the very opening of the Iliad – this is not 
Apollo shooting his arrows, this is a  plague (‘Heraclitus’, Hom. Probl. 6.5).21 It is in fact 
Plato who shows us how productive Palaephatus’ rejection of ‘blanket scepticism’ could 
actually be. 
  Before leaving ‘Palaephatus’ we may note that his (alleged) attempt to steer a 
middle way in the interpretation of myth is one of a number which survive from antiquity 
and beyond and which testify to the very vigour of the debate which the nature of 
Homeric poetry, in particular, provoked. No mode of interpretation was of course more 
fiercely contested than allegorical interpretation. When ‘Heraclitus’ begins his 
allegorizing treatise with the observation that ‘if Homer used no allegory, all his poetry is 
impious’ (Hom. Probl. 1.1), he makes clear that this was indeed a view that some held. 
Such ignorant people (cf. Hom. Probl. 3.2)
22
 occupy the same structural role for 
                                                 
19
 Cf., e.g., Hunter 2012: 84-5. I therefore differ from those, such as Werner 2012, 27-43, 
who see Socrates in the Phaedrus as rejecting all philosophical utility in myth and forms 
of mythic interpretation; for an approach closer to mine cf. Ferrari 1987, 11-12, Brouwer 
2014, 149-63. This passage of the Phaedrus is also central to Dio’s discussion of mythic 
interpretation in Oration 5, cf. Hunter forthcoming. 
20
 Cf., e.g., Hopman 2012, 181, with the bibliography cited there, Hawes 2014a, 28-36. 
21
 On ‘rationalisation’ in ‘Heraclitus’ cf., e.g., Ramelli 2003, 45. 
22
 Russell and Konstan adopt Heyne’s ἀμαθεῖς for the transmitted ἀμαθῶς at 3.2, but the 
reading does not of course affect the point being made. 
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‘Heraclitus’ as do those ‘who believe all the legomena’ for Palaephatus; both groups 
know nothing of σοφία and/or φιλοσοφία. The debate is set out for us at rather fuller 
length in Eustathius’ introduction to his commentary on the Iliad (Hom. 3.13-34), and 
here – as elsewhere – Eustathius will be drawing on earlier sources, as well as upon the 
fruits of his own reflections and learning.
23
 For Eustathius, the two extremes are 
represented by those who ‘turn everything into allegory’, even events and characters 
which are rooted in reality, what Eustathius terms τὰ ὁμολογουμένως ἱστορούμενα, ‘so 
that the poet seems to speak to us in dreams’.24 On the other side are those ‘who have 
torn off Homer’s wings and never allow him to soar aloft’, by refusing to allow any 
allegorical interpretation; for these people, whose ‘lawgiver’ was Aristarchus,25 myths are 
just that – myths. For Eustathius, the third way, and the way he will follow, is, like 
Palaephatus’ middle way, the way of careful examination and discrimination, rather than 
the imposition of totalising and undiscriminating systems; he will not be the last scholar 
to use such a rhetoric about the difference between his work and that of others, nor will 
he be the last whose practice is much less clearcut, and much more of a compromise, than 
his proclaimed methodology.
26
 Eustathius lines himself up alongside οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι, 
who take the trouble to investigate the material properly: that which is historical is 
accepted as it is, but with myths, they first consider their origin, nature and plausibility 
and then the nature of the truth which lies within them, which must be revealed through 
allegorical interpretation, θεραπεία - whether that be φυσικῶς (‘pertaining to the nature of 
the world’) or κατὰ ἦθος (‘ethical’, ‘moralising’) or ἱστορικῶς. This last method refers to 
the fact that many myths contain a central core of reality, an event or events which really 
did happen, but that reality has been distorted by mythical material to make it more 
marvellous (τοῦ δὲ μύθου τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐκβιαζομένου πρὸς τὸ τερατωδέστερον) and must 
therefore be recovered by the interpreter.
27
 Here Eustathius, like Palaephatus before him, 
                                                 
23
 On Eustathius’ allegorizing sources cf. Van der Valk 1971-1987, I: cxi-ii, II: lxxvi-ii, 
Reinhardt 1910, 36-58. Browning 1992: 143 helpfully discusses Eustathius on allegory. 
24
 Cesaretti 1991, 241 n.13 suggests that Eustathius here recalls Dio’s criticisms of 
Homer at 11.129; Eustathius certainly knew the Trojan Oration, cf. Hom. 460.6-7. As for 
Eustathius’ target, Cesaretti 1991: 231 suggests allegorists such as Metrodorus of 
Lampsacus from the fifth century BC (cf. Hunter 2012, 92, citing earlier bibliography); it 
is tempting, however, to think that Eustathius is thinking of allegorists nearer in time than 
Metrodorus. 
25
 Eustathius is of course referring to Aristarchus’ famous view (D-scholium on Il. 5.385, 
cf. Hom. 40.28-34, 561.29-30) that ‘what is said by the poet should be accepted 
mythically, in accordance with poetic licence, and readers should not busy themselves 
(περιεργαζομένους) with anything beyond what the poet said’; For differing assessments 
of what Aristarchus actually meant by this cf., e.g., Porter 1992, 70-4, Nünlist 2009, 180-
1. Eustathius’ description of his own work – περιεργάσεταί που [τοὺς μύθους] 
ἀκολούθως τοῖς παλαιοῖς – may indeed scornfully pick up Aristarchus’ verb. 
26
 For a helpful survey cf. Cesaretti 1991, 222-74. 
27
 Eustathius makes very similar points at the head of the Odyssey-commentary, where 
the purpose of τὸ τερατεύεσθαι is the creation of ἡδονή and ἔκπληξις for the audience 
(Hom. 1379.13-14). 
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is the heir of Thucydides,
28
 as well also of Strabo, a text which he knew very well indeed. 
The appeal to ἀκρίβεια, coupled with the necessity for close investigation, may itself 
descend (at an unknown number of removes) from the same programmatic chapters of 
Thucydides: at 1.22.2 the historian claims his account of what actually happened in the 
war was not based on that of any chance source, but on careful examination and weighing 
of the evidence (ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθών). 
Palaephatus had introduced his collection by noting that a readiness to believe all 
the stories which one is told was a sign of being unacquainted with σοφία and ἐπιστήμη; 
if, as we have seen, he also notes the dangers of being ‘too clever’, he nevertheless flags 
up ‘science’ (to use a loose approximation to σοφία καὶ ἐπιστήμη) as a sphere of both 
activity and discourse which stands in opposition to that of myth. This is not of course the 
place for anything like a full account of the history of these oppositions – the ‘mythos-
logos debate’ – but Palaephatus does invite us to consider something of the various ways 
in which Hellenistic and later scholars sought to make sense of the stories with which 
they were confronted. For Palaephatus, stories are distorted traces of real events – they do 
not arise ex nihilo – and as such we might naturally be tempted to associate Palaephatus 
with the first book of Strabo’s Geography, which discusses Homer and Homer’s 
geography in the light of Eratosthenes’ criticisms that (i) poetry was concerned with 
entertainment, not instruction and (ii) the accuracy of Homer’s geography made no 
contribution to his skill as a poet anyway. Strabo takes a view of poetic historicity not 
entirely unlike Palaephatus;
29
 for Strabo too legends, even apparently outlandish ones, are 
not ‘inventions (πλάσματα) of poets and prose-writers’ but rather ‘traces (ἴχνια) of people 
and events of the real past’ (1.2.14). For Strabo it is almost axiomatic that Homer would 
not simply create from nothing; I say ‘almost axiomatic’, because, although Strabo does 
in fact just assert this (to him self-evident) truth, proof, which we at least would label 
circumstantial, exists for him in Homer’s whole character and that of his poetry. As for 
the former, the opening paragraphs of Book 1 precisely depict Homer as a man of, in 
Palaephatus’ phrase, σοφία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, a φιλόσοφος in fact, and also a πολυπράγματος 
in the best sense of that term; Apuleius’ Lucius, we recall, ‘wished to know everything, 
or at least nearly everything’, whereas Strabo’s Homer ‘took pains (ἐσπούδασεν) to know 
as many πράξεις as possible and to hand them down to those who came after him’ (1.1.2). 
It is easy enough here to see that Strabo’s Homer is, in part, fashioned from the poet’s 
own Odysseus, the man who ‘knew the cities and minds of many [rather than ‘very 
many’] men’ and who did indeed record these for posterity, and in part on Strabo’s own 
sense of himself as a serious man of education in a culture where the βίος πολιτικός was 
indeed at the centre of the interests of the real or imagined audience. Like Palaephatus, at 
least in his self-presentation, Strabo too was a great traveller (2.5.11) and enquirer, 
standing in a line of descent which goes back to Odysseus and Homer himself. 
30
  
We have seen that ‘Palaephatus’ placed himself in the Herodotean tradition of the 
                                                 
28
 According to Van der Valk 1971-1987, I: ci Thucydides is only cited directly on a 
couple of occasions by Eustathius (395.34-5, 795.37). 
29
 Cf. Kim 2010, 71-7. On Strabo’s attitude to ‘myth’ cf. also Patterson 2013. 
30
 For an excellent recent account (and bibliography) of Strabo’s discussion of Homer cf. 
Kim 2010, Chapter 3. Patterson 2013, 219-221 calls attention to similarities between 
Strabo and Hecataeus. 
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travelling enquirer, and it is of course familiar that Homer is regularly depicted in the 
Lives as a traveller, so it was not difficult to bring these two traditions together in making 
Homer a kind of proto-Herodotus (as Herodotus himself may to some extent have already 
done), and this is precisely what we see Strabo, who in fact appeals to the Homeric Lives 
(1.2.29), doing in the course of his rebuttal of Eratosthenes; for Strabo prominent 
characteristics of Homer are τὸ φιλείδημον and τὸ φιλέκδημον (1.2.29), which may be 
seen as a transcription of the opening verses of the Odyssey into the language of 
scholarship. Strabo’s Homer indeed will have travelled in Egypt, just like his successor. 
We must remember that when ‘Longinus’ famously describes Herodotus as 
Ὁμηρικώτατος (De subl. 13.3), the poet had in part long been fashioned in the image of 
the historian; Ὅμηρος Ἡροδοτικώτατος had just as good a claim to reality for part of the 
critical tradition. In introducing Homer as a man of consummate knowledge both of 
public life and of the geography of the whole world, Strabo notes: 
 
οὐ γὰρ ἂν μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων αὐτῆς περάτων ἀφίκετο τῇ μνήμῃ κύκλῳ περιιών 
 
For [if this were not the case] he would never have reached as far as the furthest 
bounds of the inhabited world as he travelled around it in a circle in his 
description. 
Strabo 1.1.2 
 
‘Travelling’ for an enquirer can take more than one form, and Strabo here (surely 
deliberately) runs the language of description and the language of travelling together;
31
 
modern editors and translators differ as to whether τῇ μνήμῃ should be taken with 
ἀφίκετο (so, e.g., Radt, Aujac) or with περιιών (so, e.g., H.L. Jones in the Loeb), but it is 
rather the richly significant language which is to be noted. Poets, Homer above all, travel 
around the world and thus ‘map’ it for us. μνήμη itself need not be ambivalent, but a 
glance at LSJ will remind us that this word for ‘memorial, record’ also has a marked 
intellectual sense as ‘memory’, and Strabo’s language here hovers between placing 
Homer as an actual traveller and the picture of the poet offered some two centuries later 
by Maximus of Tyre of a Homer whose soul, like that of Aristeas of Proconessus or of 
the philosopher as Socrates describes him in the Theaetetus, travels all over the world 
gathering information.
32
 
If we turn from the poet to his poems, we may infer, so Strabo implies, from the 
fact that the vast bulk of what Homer describes is either factual or has a factual basis that 
this applies to the poems as a whole; moreover, as Homer’s poetry is universally 
acknowledged as a suitable subject for philosophical investigation (a φιλοσόφημα), this 
could not be the case if it was simply invented ex nihilo (1.2.17). Whereas for 
Palaephatus myth arose as a kind of sideways leap into error arising from 
misunderstanding, a misunderstanding that fundamentally changed the nature of what 
was being described, for Strabo the mythical and the fantastic are rather additions which 
may to some extent distort but do not fundamentally alter the truths which remain visible 
                                                 
31
 The same language recurs, but at greater expansiveness and therefore with less 
complex resonance, at 1.1.10. 
32
 Max. Tyr. 26.1, cf. Hunter 2012, 52-4. 
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below the accretions. Homer takes his ἀρχαί, his starting-points, from ἱστορία (1.2.9). 
What does Strabo mean by the ἱστορία from which Homer took his starting-points?; 
according to Radt it is ‘die historische Überlieferung’, for Aujac ‘sa vaste information’, 
for Jones simply ‘history’. The remainder of the chapter and the following one on the 
Argonautic expedition (1.2.10), however, make plain that Strabo understands Homer to 
have drawn on his own knowledge (the verb εἰδέναι is repeatedly used) in building his 
mixture of the true and the false, and so the question becomes one of the source of that 
knowledge. Strabo’s first set of examples perhaps poses more questions than it answers: 
 
ἔλαβεν οὖν παρὰ τῆς ἱστορίας τὰς ἀρχάς. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Αἰόλον δυναστεῦσαί φασι 
τῶν περὶ τὴν Λιπάραν νήσων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν Αἴτνην καὶ Λεοντίνην Κύκλωπας 
καὶ Λαιστρυγόνας ἀξένους τινάς· διὸ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν πορθμὸν ἀπροσπέλαστα 
εἶναι τοῖς τότε καὶ τὴν Χάρυβδιν καὶ τὸ Σκύλλαιον ὑπὸ λῃστῶν κατέχεσθαι. 
 
 
Homer took his starting-points from historia. For they say
33
 that Aeolus ruled 
over the islands around Lipari, and the inhospitable Cyclopes and Laistrygonians 
over the regions around Aetna and Leontine; the result was the area around the 
Strait was unapproachable for men of that time and Charybdis and the Skyllaion 
were the haunt of pirates. 
Strabo 1.2.9 
 
Whereas we would be tempted to say that these ‘historical facts’, what Strabo elsewhere 
(e.g. 3.4.4) calls τὰ ἱστορούμενα, were in fact post-Homeric interpretations of Homeric 
geography, and in one case at least a rationalising interpretation of Homeric myth (cf. 
Palaephatus 20 on Skylla as a Tyrrhenian pirate ship), Strabo seems to take these 
‘reports’ as evidence for the historical core of Homer’s account of Odysseus’ wanderings, 
or perhaps even as themselves the source of Homer’s knowledge: through ἱστορία, then, 
Homer learned things for which, though of course Strabo does not say this, Homer is 
himself the principal authority. Another way of putting this is to say that, in searching for 
the historical core upon which Homer has elaborated, Strabo seizes upon the results 
achieved by various post-Homeric traditions which had sought precisely to 
demythologize Homer and to find ways of accommodating him both to contemporary 
geography and to a sense of what is possible in nature; Strabo has done no more than 
accept, and make use of (in a rather eclectic way), the work of those who had gone before 
him. The very vagueness of ἱστορία and (probably) φασί masks Strabo’s operation and 
casts back into an indeterminate past a popular knowledge which may, so we are led to 
believe, have been available to Homer himself.  
In an important methodological statement Strabo considers the task of the critic: 
                                                 
33
 Casaubon’s φασί for the transmitted φησί seems hard to resist, for Homer manifestly 
does not ‘say’, e.g., that Aeolus ruled over the Lipari islands. Biraschi 2005, 78 sees here 
an example of Strabo failing to differentiate between what is explicitly in Homer and 
what is in the exegetical tradition about Homer, but – apart from other considerations – 
this does not suit the rhetoric of Strabo’s chapter (cf. further Kim 2010, 69 n.55). Jones 
retains φησί with ἱστορία as the subject, which is hard to believe. 
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ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντα μυθεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλείω προσμυθεύουσι, καὶ μάλιστα 
Ὅμηρος, ὁ ζητῶν τί οἱ παλαιοὶ προσμυθεύουσιν οὐ ζητεῖ, εἰ τὰ προσμυθευόμενα 
ὑπῆρξεν ἢ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον οἷς προσμυθεύεται τόποις ἢ προσώποις, περὶ 
ἐκείνων ζητεῖ τἀληθές, οἷον τὴν Ὀδυσσέως πλάνην, εἰ γέγονε καὶ ποῦ. 
Since the tellers of myth, and most of all Homer, do not tell myths in all they say, 
but for the most part add myth (, the person who investigates what mythical 
element the ancients added does not investigate whether the added mythical 
elements existed or exist, but rather investigates the truth concerning the places or 
the people to which the mythical elements were added; for example, whether the 
wanderings of Odysseus happened and where. 
Strabo 1.2.19 
 
Strabo indeed finds proof of this ‘additive theory’ of myth, one not of course all that far 
in fact from what Thucydides had said about the activities of poets and logographers, not 
just in what Homer describes, but in the language in which he describes processes of 
artistic and verbal creation. In 1.2.9, in very quick succession, Homer’s process of 
προσμυθεύειν is compared to Hephaestus’ making of the Shield of Achilles in Iliad 18, 
Athena’s beautification of Odysseus in Odyssey 6 (which Homer had compared to 
another piece of skilful metalwork), and finally to Odysseus’ false tale ‘like truth’ to 
Penelope in Odyssey 19. This final example takes us, as is well known, not just sideways 
to what the Muses say to Hesiod at the opening of the Theogony, but also forward – via 
Plato
34
 - to the development of what we might call a ‘theory of fiction’ in the Hellenistic 
and later periods. Basic to any such theory, ancient or modern, is a distinction between 
types of narrative; the most famous such ancient distinction, was that between ‘history’, 
‘fictional narrative’ or πλάσμα, and myth,35 and Strabo’s discussion should be seen as a 
contribution to emerging ideas of the fictional and the mythical.  
 Strabo returns repeatedly to these themes in the course of the Geography. When 
discussing the Iberian peninsula, for example, Strabo considers the evidence that Homer, 
‘a many of many voices and much learning’ (πολύφωνός τις ὢν καὶ πολυίστωρ),36 knew 
something of these areas (3.2.12-13). Thus, for example, ‘one might conjecture’ that 
Homer named Tartaros from Tartessos, of which he had heard something, ‘adding also a 
myth, thus preserving the poetical element’. It was Homer’s habit always ‘to derive his 
myths from historical facts (τοὺς μύθους ἀπό τινων ἱστοριῶν ἐνάγων)’, and this in fact 
accounts for the genesis of the two great poems: 
 
καὶ ἡ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως δὲ στρατεία δοκεῖ μοι δεῦρο γενηθεῖσα καὶ ἱστορηθεῖσα ὑπ’ 
αὐτοῦ παραδοῦναι πρόφασιν, ὥστε τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν καθάπερ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιάδα ἀπὸ 
τῶν συμβάντων μεταγαγεῖν εἰς ποίησιν καὶ τὴν συνήθη τοῖς ποιηταῖς μυθοποιίαν. 
                                                 
34
 Cf. esp. Republic 2.382c10-d4, with the discussion of Gill 1993. 
35
 For discussion and bibliography cf., e.g., Rispoli 1988. 
36
 The latter adjective is also apparently applied to Homer in a (probably Chian) 
inscription of Augustan date, cf. Jones forthcoming; Strabo uses it also of Callimachus 
(9.5.17). 
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I think that the expedition of Odysseus took place here and the fact that he had 
gathered information about it gave him an opportunity (πρόφασις). The result was 
that, just as he had done with the Iliad, he transferred the Odyssey from events 
which had happened into poetry and the inventive myth which is customary for 
poets. 
Strabo 3.2.13 
 
Strabo then goes on to detail the traces of the nostoi of the Greeks and the wanderings of 
the Trojans which exist in the West: 
 
ἥ τε τοῦ Αἰνείου παραδέδοται πλάνη καὶ Ἀντήνορος καὶ ἡ τῶν Ἑνετῶν· ὡσαύτως 
καὶ ἡ Διομήδους τε καὶ Μενελάου καὶ ἄλλων πλειόνων. ὁ τοίνυν ποιητὴς τὰς 
τοσαύτας στρατείας ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσχατα τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἱστορηκώς, πυνθανόμενος δὲ καὶ 
πλοῦτον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς (οἱ γὰρ Φοίνικες ἐδήλουν τοῦτο) ἐνταῦθα τὸν τῶν 
εὐσεβῶν ἔπλασε χῶρον καὶ τὸ Ἠλύσιον πεδίον … 
 
 
The wanderings of Aeneas are transmitted, as are those of Antenor and the 
Henetoi, and also of Diomedes and Menelaos and Odysseus and many others. The 
poet, therefore, having gathered information about so many expeditions to the 
furthest parts of Iberia and having heard about the wealth and the other 
advantages [of the area] (for the Phoenicians were making this clear) fictionally 
placed the place of the blessed and the Elysian plain here …  
Strabo 3.2.13 
 
What should be most striking here, as before, is Strabo’s language of historical process, 
which both seems confidently to carry an argument forward, but is also extraordinarily 
vague and short on detail. Homer has Phoenician informants (μηνυταί, 3.2.14), but the 
actual nature of his ἱστορίαι, to say nothing of the process of transmission (παράδοσις) of 
‘historical information’, is left entirely impressionistic. The vagueness works, of course, 
in Strabo’s favour: we are so used, above all from Herodotus, to such language, and to 
the distinctions between history and myth, that Strabo appears to be describing the most 
natural process in the world, whereas in fact he is creating a historical and historicizing 
Homer before our eyes. The very audacity of the undertaking is too often overlooked in 
our understandable concern with Strabo’s sources, a concern not infrequently reinforced 
by a sense that Strabo is not the intellectual equal of those sources. 
Strabo’s discussion of Homer is, in part, a contribution to emerging ideas of the 
fictional and the mythical, and it opens a window not merely on to ancient Homeric 
criticism, but also, as does Palaephatus’ Preface, on to ancient attempts to delineate the 
boundaries of the mythical. In conclusion, however, it must be stressed that so many of 
these critical and interpretative issues were not merely sharpened in the discussion of 
Homer, but could be seen to have always been already there in Homer. One Homeric 
episode, in particular, raises these questions in a particularly sharp way.  
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Menelaus’ account to Telemachus of his nostos in Odyssey 4 foreshadows 
Odysseus’ account of his own return in various ways,37 but does so, not just at greatly 
reduced length, but also in a ‘lower’, more realistic key. Not of course that there is 
anything strictly realistic about sea-goddesses, disguising oneself as a seal, and the 
metamorphoses of Proteus; indeed the figure of Proteus was subject to some of the most 
richly allegorical readings of any Homeric character. Nevertheless, whether we consider 
the geography of Menelaus’ travels which, whatever view one takes of them (cf. Strabo 
1.2.31), stands in sharp contrast to those of Odysseus (cf. vv. 83-5), or motifs such as that 
of the companions’ hunger, for which the attempted cure is fishing rather than killing the 
Cattle of the Sun (vv. 368-9), it is clear that Menelaus’ nostos is (in many, though not all, 
respects) ‘ordinary’ in comparison to that of Odysseus; Menelaus, πολλὰ παθὼν καὶ 
πόλλ᾽ ἐπαληθείς (4.81), is clearly in fact set up by Homer as an ‘Odysseus-light’. When 
Menelaus is, like Odysseus, driven off course while rounding Cape Malea (3.287), he 
ends in Egypt where (so Nestor reports and Menelaus confirms) ‘he travelled around 
collecting rich resources and gold’ (3.301, cf. 4.81-91), a detail that reminds us perhaps 
of Odysseus’ Cretan tales (cf. esp. Odyssey 14.285-6); Odysseus, on the other hand, was 
swept for nine days from Cape Malea to the land of the Lotus-eaters. The reason for 
Menelaus being detained in Egypt, his failure to offer sufficient sacrifices to the gods 
before setting out (vv. 351-2, 472-80), reads in fact very like the kind of post factum 
explanation for problems that any one could make in antiquity: no inference from trouble 
is more common in ancient texts than that some god or gods must have been offended, an 
inference which also suggests a cure. This is not of course (or not necessarily) to suggest 
that we are to suspect that the whole episode of Eidothea, the seals and the 
metamorphoses of Proteus are to be understood as figments of Menelaus’ imagination, 
dressing up a very ordinary explanation for lack of forward progress in exotic 
mythological clothing, especially of course as modern scholarship has repeatedly 
speculated that Menelaus’ adventures were, in an earlier version of the Odyssey, precisely 
Odysseus’ adventures.38 Be that as it may, however, once Menelaus has made his 
sacrifice it is all (apparently) smooth sailing, but once Odysseus eventually gets home, he 
not only has the suitors to deal with, but he also has the famous journey carrying an oar to 
the ends of the earth to look forward to, an elaborate sacrifice to Poseidon, and then, 
when he gets home again, further sacrifices ‘to all the immortals in succession’ (11.119-
34). We might sense here, not just the way in which Homer arranges Menelaus’ nostos to 
the greater glory of Odysseus (observe in particular Menelaus’ total dependence upon 
Eidothea, whereas in the Cyclops-adventure, for example, the bringing of the wine, the 
blinding, and the trick of the sheep are all the products of Odysseus’ intelligence, 9. 213-
15, 316-18, 420-4), but the beginnings of a difference between what later critics would 
                                                 
37
 Cf., e.g., De Jong 2001, 105-6; on some of the narrative problems raised by Menelaus’ 
account cf. Danek 1998, 113-20. 
38
 For this argument and bibliography cf. West 2005, 60-1, 2014, 117-18. The effect 
would be not unlike that produced if we take, as a number of scholars have suggested, the 
Cretan tales either as ‘realistic fiction’ (uel sim) or as remnants of earlier versions of the 
Odyssey, now surpassed in their poetic extravagance (and artfulness) by Books 9-12, cf., 
e.g., Woodhouse 1930, 132, Reece 1994. For Cretan traditions and the Odyssey more 
generally cf. Martin n.d., Levaniouk 2012. 
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call plasma and mythos. If certain aspects of Menelaus’ nostos do indeed recall the 
Cretan tales, then we will also be reminded that those tales, as ‘false things like true …’, 
occupy a very special place in the history of, and theorising about, fictional narrative. 
Palaephatus and Strabo are important stages on a journey which began with Homer 
himself. 
 
University of Cambridge 
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